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From nonviolent practice toward a theory of political power
This article builds on foundations laid by Etienne de La Boétie to develop a
theory of political power, in which violence is a marginalised and marginal
phenomenon in the multiple dimensions in which power operates. This positive 
understanding of nonviolence depends for its success on a willingness to use our
own bodies (not those of others) to preserve our own freedom and that of others,
the capacity to communicate without intersubjective violence, and numbers.
Using examples from nonviolent practice in Israel and occupied Palestinian
territory it demonstrates that it is possible to do politics differently without the
support of violence.
Keywords: nonviolence; power; pacifism; Israel; Palestine, Etienne de la Boétie
Introduction
Within political science and the cognate discipline of international relations nonviolence
has been a hidden, subaltern, ‘subjugated’ knowledge (Jackson 2018a, 155, 2018b). 
This article invites critical study of this subjugated knowledge and in particular what
can be learned from the practice of concerted nonviolent action. My ambition is to 
demonstrate that it is possible to dispense with violence to make changes in each of the
multiple dimensions in which power operates. Changes in the first dimension of power 
imply that actors succeed in coercing their rulers to do something that they would not
otherwise do without resort to violence. To raise the bar, I also assess the effectiveness
of nonviolence in transforming second dimension power relations from zero sum to 
positive sum. Are more issues and people structured in following nonviolent action?
Even more ambitious are changes at the third dimension taken-for-granted order of 
things such that people come to think of violence as irrational, inappropriate, or a










   
 
 
    
 
    
   
  




   
relentlessly flexible concerted power that is without the support of violence. It is the
sum of these complex changes at different levels that are the basis for my assessment of 
the effectiveness of nonviolence in stopping violence by others. 
The originality of the article lies in the combination of findings from my 
experience of nonviolent practice with a close reading of the sixteenth century essay 
The Politics of Obedience: A Discourse on Voluntary Servitude by Etienne de la Boétie
(1975). This essay is abstract, deductive and divorced from practice and best known for 
the theory of consent embedded in la Boétie’s explanation of  ‘how it happens that so 
many men, so many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a
single tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him’ (1975,42). I 
demonstrate that a theory of political power relevant to the contemporary practice of 
nonviolent action can be developed out of La Boétie’s approach to freedom, 
intersubjectivity and action combined with his insights into the multiple dimensions in 
which power operates. 
I begin with a brief literature review taking as my point of departure La Boétie’s
essay. The essay was quoted at length by Leo Tolstoy (Tolstoy 1970, 35) who 
developed the theory of consent in his Letter to a Hindu: The Subjection of India – Its
Cause and Cure which was read and distributed by Mohandas Gandhi (Gandhi, 1910). I 
pick up the story of this theory of political power, with the US American writer, Gene
Sharp. Sharp was influenced by La Boétie’s essay (1973, 34) in the development of his
theory that all dominating elites and rulers depend for their sources of power upon the
cooperation of the population and of the institutions of the society they would rule.
Sharp and his followers have been criticised on the grounds that the functional one-
dimensional nonviolent action they advocated may serve to reinforce violent structures





















    
  
 
    
limitations of Sharp’s theory lie in his explicit rejection of the moral foundations of 
nonviolent action. Despite claiming that he set out to develop a conceptual framework 
for liberation, Sharp gave scant attention to La Boétie’s exposition of the situated, 
embodied nature of freedom and the interdependence of my freedom with that of others. 
For the development of my own understanding of freedom, power and violence I return 
to La Boétie repeatedly throughout this article. 
The following four short sections are the building blocks for a theory of 
nonviolence that is transformative of multi-dimensional power relations, is situated in 
practice, and is organised around the principles of form, meaning and number. First, I 
begin by uncovering the ontological and epistemological standpoints of a group of 
peace researchers (Gregg, Curle and Lederach) who differ from Sharp in emphasising 
that freedom is embodied and that being-in-the-world is contingent, social, capable and 
vulnerable. Next, I distinguish between power, and in particular the concerted power of 
Hannah Arendt, and violence. Following Howes (2009) I identify two forms of 
violence: intersubjective violence and the physical violence it engenders. Lastly, in 
order to weigh the effectiveness of nonviolence in reducing or stopping the violence of 
others in a world characterised by complexity I adopt Haugaard’s example of 
‘bracketing’ certain aspects of reality (2018). This ‘bracketing’ is helpful in 
understanding the effectiveness of stopping violence within the multiple and 
normatively neutral dimensions in which power operates. 
A methodology section then describes how this experimental theory is grounded 
in my experience of organised, practical action performed in the public realm in the
context of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. The results are both reflexive
and collaborative in that they are grounded in my own experiences and relationships
(Reed-Danahay 2001). Three practical examples illustrate this bottom up, experimental
4
  






















theory: refusal of military service, unarmed popular resistance, and the appeal for 
boycott divestment and sanctions. 
These three examples of practical action and their varied impact help me to build 
a typology of nonviolence organised around form, meaning and numbers. Nonviolence
requires willingness to use one’s own body (not another’s) to protect the freedom of the
self and of the other; thoughtful attentiveness to the meaning of the interaction; and as 
Arendt said, numbers of people rather than implements (1970, 42). I conclude that,
given the limited success of violence in reducing or stopping violence, pacifist politics
(politics without the support of either physical or intersubjective violence) both merits
more attention and has the potential to be transformative of the multiple dimensions in 
which power operates.
The Politics of Obedience
In his essay on The Politics of Obedience: A Discourse of Voluntary Servitude La 
Boétie made the argument that violence was not necessary, and that nonviolence could 
be equally if not more effective in reducing or stopping the violence of others. Just
when his contemporary Niccolo Machiavelli was developing his instructions for the
Prince as to how he should consolidate his rule over others, La Boétie was making the
provocative claim that we can each refuse to consent to our own enslavement. 
According to La Boétie state rule depended on the way in which the inhabitants ‘permit, 
or, rather, bring about, their own subjection, since by ceasing to submit they would put
an end to their servitude’ (La Boétie 1975, 46).
In the story of this theory of political power, in which violence is a marginalised 
and marginal phenomenon, there is a direct line from La Boétie to Tolstoy to Gandhi.




   
                 
           
     
  
  
   
 
 
     
    
 
   
   
 





to multiple movements that adopted nonviolent resistance to governments, characterised 
by him as dictatorships, also quoted La Boétie
He who abuses you so has only two eyes, has but two hands, one body, and has
naught but what has the least man of the great and infinite number of your cities,
except for the advantage you give him to destroy you. (La Boétie 1975, 12, Sharp
1973, 11)
Sharp went out of his way to make a distinction between pacifism or moral or religious
‘nonviolence’ and what he calls ‘political defiance’ or ‘nonviolent struggle applied 
defiantly and actively for political purposes’ (2010, 137). For Sharp, nonviolent action 
was a pragmatic portfolio of tactics and his writings were manuals for action. His 
prescriptive writing has been complemented by political theory that was developed to 
make retrospective sense of nonviolent action as a recurring feature of oppositional
movements which won changes in government (Sharp 1990, Schell 2003, Roberts
2011, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Sharp did warn that a strategy that limits its 
objective to merely destroying the incumbent dictatorship runs a great risk of producing 
another tyrant. He spoke too of the importance of the empowerment of the population in 
order to prevent the rise of a new dictatorship, however he stopped short of elaborating
the ontological or epistemological foundations of the transformation of relations 
individually or socially. 
Following the surfacing of nonviolent action in Iran in June 2009, then in 
Tunisia, and then in the wider Middle East and North Africa, there has been another 
round of literature which questions its effectiveness in reducing or stopping violence by 
others especially when that violence may be embedded in structural or hegemonic
systems and everyday practices. Hallward and Norman distinguished between 





     
   
  
   
  
 
   
   
    
   
 
   
   
 
    
    
 
   
  
    
 
nonviolence, which seeks to change the social structures and patterns of relations that
sustain conflict (2015, 8).  ‘The Violence of Nonviolence: Problematizing Nonviolent
Resistance in Iran and Egypt’ by Sean Chabot and Majid Sharifi (2013) argued that by 
adopting Sharp’s nonviolent methods to confront the visible violence of domestic
regimes, Iranian and Egyptian activists had reproduced and reinforced the invisible
structures and forms of violence (2013, 220). These criticisms echoed an early feminist
critique of Sharp, which had argued that while Sharp understood power to be plural and 
relational he did not discuss how that relationship is constructed or who benefits from
the relation (McGuinness 1993, 113). While recognising the shortcomings of Sharp’s
elaboration of nonviolence, his critics have been reluctant to let go of the possibility of 
developing a political theory of pragmatic nonviolence (Schock 2015). Researchers
have even attempted to analyse the practices of Gandhi as practical action in politics
without an ethical lens (Mantena 2012). A recent sustained endeavour to build a
political theory that de-emphasises moral arguments against violence and to argue for 
the possibility of pacifism in interpersonal, intrastate, and interstate interactions is that
by Dustin Ells Howes (2009). Like La Boétie, Howes put at the core of his work the
theoretical task of delinking freedom from the necessary use of violence (2015, 2016). 
According to La Boétie ‘in order to have liberty nothing more is needed than to 
long for it.’ (1975, 46) This conception of freedom, as willed, is introduced by Howes
in Toward a Credible Pacifism: Violence and the Possibilities of Politics (2009, x) and 
is developed further in Freedom without Violence: Resisting the Western Political
Tradition (2016). In contrast to Sharp and the proponents of civil resistance, Howes
elaborates the particular understanding of self, intersubjectivity, agency and power he
argues is associated with freedom without violence. To do this he draws on Arendt’s
thinking on power, by which she understood not just the human ability to act but to act
7
  
     
    
   









    
 




     
 
   
   
in concert (1970, 44). Howes takes up the challenge laid down by La Boétie of showing 
that violence is an inessential aspect of politics and power. He points to 
transformational political outcomes over sustained periods of incremental change that
have been achieved without the support of violence giving the examples of women’s
suffrage and the abolition of slavery (Howes 2009, 123). The examples Howes chooses
are reminders of how difficult it is to claim political outcomes given the slippery nature
of power relations and the reappearance of coercive relations in different iterations. 
Amy Allen has exposed the multiple and moving axes of stratification affecting women 
in her account of the power of feminist theory (Allen, 1999). In the case of slavery, Lisa
Guenther has demonstrated how the Thirteenth Amendment only partly abolished 
slavery in the United States, making an exception for convicted criminals. It states that
‘neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted (emphasis added),  shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction’ (Guenther 2013, xvii).
The difficulty of claiming political outcomes brings me to two final, and related, 
aspects of the literature on nonviolence. Firstly, it is often described as ‘marginalised,’ 
(Atack 2012, 3) ‘ridiculed,’ (Gregg and Tully 2018) even ‘subjugated’ (Jackson 2018a, 
2018b). In the words of Maciej Bartkowski it requires ‘recovery.’(2015) Secondly, 
nonviolence has a richer history in practice than in theory. Is it because of the situated 
and performative nature of nonviolent political action that theorists have neglected 
nonviolence? Iain Atack’s book Nonviolence in Political Theory (2012) is an exception. 
Nevertheless, echoing my point about the situated and performative nature of his topic,
he opens the book by stating that nonviolence has been a basis for his ‘practical























   
  
On the spectrum of ‘pacifism to warism’ (Cady 2010) there is a vast and 
separate literature that justifies the use of violence to stop the violence of others, which 
I do not consider here. In particular, I do not discuss the place of nonviolence in the
context of justifications of state sovereignty and the state’s monopoly over the
legitimate use of violence (Atack 2012, 34-100). Although, a number of the people that
I cite identify themselves as ‘human rights defenders’ I also deliberately do not engage
with the literature related to human rights (Gordon and Berkovitch 2007, Hopgood 
2009, 2015, Perugini and Gordon 2015). My focus is on practice not universal or ideal
types. 
I do not rule out that violence can successfully achieve political outcomes,
however, given the ambivalent record of violence in stopping violence, I declare my 
interest in a conception of power that dispenses with violence. This is my insurgent and 
utopian answer to what Edward Said called the beginning questions, ‘why imagine
power in the first place, and what is the relationship between one’s motive for 
imagining power and the image one ends up with’ (Said, 2000, 241).
How does freedom manifest itself?
‘Since freedom is our natural state, we are not only in possession of it, but have the urge
to defend it’ (La Boétie 1975, 51). La Boétie speaks at this point in the first person 
plural, however, we are not all identical, instead ‘mother [nature]… has fashioned us
according to the same model so that in beholding one another we might almost
[emphasis added] recognize ourselves.’ From our different positions we reach across to 
these different but similar beings and exercise ‘the great gift of voice and speech for 
fraternal relationship.’ In relationship and in communication with each other we become
one organic whole and we can each freely choose to act ‘in as much as we are all
9
  
   
   
   
 
 






   





comrades’ (1975, 51). Like Arendt, La Boétie sees that freedom manifests itself in 
action and that the condition for any action is plurality, making freedom dependent on
the public domain (Gordon 2001, 97).
It is also through action and speech that we reveal ourselves to each other. 
According to Arendt, this subjective in-between is not tangible, but is no less real than 
the world of things we visibly have in common. She calls this reality the ‘web’ of 
human relationships (Arendt 1958, 182). The necessity of others to our experience of 
the world is echoed by Jean Zaru when she says that ‘truth involves a vulnerable and 
faithful risk taking. It involves real relationship’ (Zaru, Eck and Schrader 2008, 25).
This view of truth and reality implies that there is no view from nowhere, instead the
subject, together with its sensations and praxis, is always embodied, placed or 
contingent.
Epistemological humility
This phenomenological understanding of politics requires further discussion. Jean Zaru 
whose autobiography Occupied with Nonviolence (2008) I have just quoted from
identifies herself as a Palestinian Quaker. She was brought up in the dissident Protestant
tradition that emerged during the English Revolution. The peace researchers and 
practitioners I refer to here are all part of a Quaker or Anabaptist tradition. Without
essentialising the Quaker as ‘the stranger’ (Hopgood 2009, 238) I find within these
peace researchers a specific shared perspective. This perspective is not just
contextualised it is embodied. Adam Curle challenged the separation of mind and body 
and the perception of events as having discrete chains of causation (Curle 1995, 
Mitchels 2006). This critique of linearity is also core to the peace scholar John Paul









   





   
   







Associated with this phenomenological conception of the body is an attitude of 
epistemological humility. For the phenomenologist, the individual’s perspective is
always partial and incomplete. This epistemological humility is also foundational to 
peace researchers and practitioners. At its most practical it encourages a ‘slow but sure’ 
way of working (Gregg and Tully 2018, ix) as the peace practitioner leaves room for 
doubt and changes of heart. In extremis it is the basis on which someone may freely 
choose to give up his or her own life rather than impose his or her own truth on another 
and destroy the will of another person.
Power, violence and nonviolence
So far this phenomenological stance does not imply an ethical position. Power in all its
forms (power over, power to, and power with) is positive only in the sense that it is
constitutive of intersubjectivity, it is not more or less worthy or objectionable (Haugaard 
2012, 2018). I will now develop the points made above in relation to embodiment and 
epistemological incompleteness in order to pursue the discussion of power and violence. 
Howes identifies two forms of violence. First he distinguishes physical violence, ‘the
use or destruction of another’s body in order to subdue or destroy their will’ (2009, 5).
Secondly he defines intersubjective violence, which ‘involves the experience of 
profoundly discordant dispositions, or encounters with individuals or groups that
severely compromise or make our own way of being impossible’ (2009, 6). The first
form of violence is directly related to the body. The second form of violence is
epistemological. Earlier I stressed that La Boétie said that we might ‘almost’ recognise
ourselves. For the phenomenologists being with others involves creating a self that is an 























          
 
  
Sharp, intersubjective violence, which animates physical violence, manifests itself when 
we undermine through thought, word, or deed the freedom of the other.1 
There is an important implication that stems from the view that power and 
violence are distinguishable, especially when it is combined with i) Arendt’s
understanding of power involving people acting in concert with one another and ii) 
Arendt’s understanding that this power is sustained by the freedom and plurality that
characterises intersubjectivity. The implication is that ‘power is self sufficient in the
sense that it can be sustained and nourished without the support of violence’ (Howes
2009, 7). Departing from Sharp and following La Boétie, this then is my positive
understanding of nonviolence: it is the power that can be sustained without the support
of violence. 
Complexity and the web of human relationships
La Boétie’s essay exhorts the reader in an appeal in the first person singular. ‘I do not
ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support
him no longer.’ (La Boétie 1975, 48) Arendt writes in the first person plural ‘When we
say of somebody that he is “in power” we actually refer to his being empowered by a
certain number of people to act in their name’ (Arendt 1970, 44). This plurality shifts
the focus from the self as subject to the in-between, to what La Boétie refers to as ‘the
world as dwelling place’ where we are in ‘fraternal relationship, thus achieving by the
common and mutual statement of our thoughts a communion of our wills.’ In this
1 Gandhi distinguished between satyagraha and the negative duragraha. The latter allowed for












    
    
     
  
  







section I want to unpack what happens in-between in ‘the web of human relationships.’
So far I have developed a theory in which all individuals are free and embodied, 
and that freedom is exercised through speech and action in the public realm. To this I 
add the insight from Lederach that the world is complex and change is not tied 
exclusively to one thing, one action or one option (2003, 54). This aspect of complexity 
necessitates the last step I want to introduce before discussing the examples of practical
action. If we are to assess the effectiveness of nonviolence in stopping violence by 
others, we will need to be able to make the comparison between complex political
outcomes. To capture change in the multiple different dimensions of power, I follow
Haugaard’s example and ‘bracket’ aspects of the intangible reality in-between (2018). 
When protesters succeed in coercing a strong man leader to leave office
(something that he would not otherwise do) without the support of violence, first
dimension power relations between the leader and the protesters change. However, as 
Chabot and Sharifi (2013) showed in the case of Egypt this still leaves the office of the
leader intact and with it conventional state structures and power politics, at both 
domestic and international levels. To satisfy Chabot and Sharifi second dimension 
power relations would have to be transformed and more issues and more people
structured in following nonviolent action. Sharp himself recommended that if economic
issues are prominent in the struggle then care will be needed that economic grievances
can actually be remedied after the change in government (2010, 54). Even more
ambitious would be change at the third dimension taken-for-granted order of things. 
Change at this third dimension level in terms of stopping violence by others would 
require that the mass of subject people shake off the habit of taking coercive power 
relations and their position within them for granted and instead come to think of 
violence as irrational, inappropriate, or a category mistake. Paradoxically, in the fourth 
13
  
      
  







     
 





    
 
 
dimension everyone would be free actors with no escape from the concerted power that
is without the support of violence. It is the sum of these complex changes at different
levels that have to be the basis of any assessment of nonviolence in stopping violence
by others and I will illustrate this below in my discussion of examples of practical
action. 
Methodology 
First let me explain my positionality because ‘when we attempt to eliminate the
personal, we lose sight of ourselves, our deeper intuition, and the source of our 
understandings— who we are and how we are in the world.’ Lederach went on to say, 
so-called objectivity brings us to a paradoxical destination: ‘We believe in the
knowledge we generate but not in the inherently messy and personal process by which 
we acquired it’ (2005, ix). It was the Quakers that gave me my first job, and it was
through the Quakers that I was first introduced to Palestinians and Israelis, as well a
minority who identify themselves as Palestinian and Israeli whether because they were
Jewish and living in Palestine before 1948 or because they were Palestinian and found 
themselves living in Israel after 1948. These encounters are an important source of my 
understandings. Quaker Peace and Service (UK and Ireland) employed me as part of 
what I now look back upon as a rather Rawls experiment (Rawls 1971, 12), where I 
volunteered for a placement in the Middle East from behind ‘a veil of ignorance’ and 
did not know where I would go in advance. Every volunteer had to be willing to be
placed in any one of the host organisations that were part of the programme, whether it
was in Tel Aviv, Gaza or Amman. I was seconded for two years to the Hebron 
University Graduates Union (1987-1989) in the occupied Palestinian West Bank. Later I 





   
   
 

















American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) based in East Jerusalem (2009-2014).
This article is based on that work. Just as in the practice of autoethnography I 
also acknowledge that my research cannot be separated from experience and 
relationships gained at other times in other places. The first example of practical action 
draws on video testimonies recorded and made public by Israel Social TV, an 
organisation I first got to know in 2010 when on behalf of my employer I commissioned 
a series of short films about militarism;2 the second example references interview
material gathered as part of an oral history project conducted in partnership between the
Palestinian Popular Struggle Coordinating Committee and Coventry University in the
course of 2018 but in an area of the West Bank known to me since 1987;3 and the third 
example is developed based on the response of AFSC as an organisation to the 2005 
Palestinian appeal for boycott, divestment and sanctions at a time when I was the
organisation’s representative in the Middle East. The quotations are from individuals
known to me directly, or accessed through organisations that I have had a relationship 
with over many years. Their words are either already published or were recorded, 
transcribed and translated in compliance with Coventry University Ethics requirements.
2 Established in 2006, Israel Social TV is a non-profit independent media organisation 
promoting social change. https://tv.social.org.il/eng/about-us
3 The On our Land project involved a team of researchers from Coventry University led 
by Marwan Darweish, and including Elly Harrowell, Patricia Sellick, Mahmoud 
Soliman and  Laura Sulin. It received support from the British Council’s £30m
Cultural Protection Fund, in partnership with the Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, which is set up to protect cultural heritage at risk due




       
   
    
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
            
 
 
   
      
     
     
       
However affirmative the Quakers were of my actions, I set out here to find a
rationale for my action that works for a person of no religious faith. This is my attempt
to develop a theory in which people rule themselves without resort to either physical or 
intersubjective violence. The practice of nonviolence has been submerged. This
research is from those depths, and is a bottom up, practical, experimental kind of theory 
building.
Three examples of practical action
For the purposes of comparison I adopt three organising principles, which I label using 
a short hand of form, meaning and numbers, arising from the previous discussion of 
embodiment, intersubjectivity and concerted power. For each example I consider 
whether or not the action leaves the individual vulnerable to physical harm or 
incarceration; how far it is performed in the public realm and the meaning ascribed to 
that performance; and the numbers of people involved in the action.
Refusal of military service
‘Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed.’ (La Boétie, 48) La Boétie introduces
the possibility that the will alone, because of its capacity for refusal, is sufficient for 
political freedom. My first example relates to those young Israelis who refuse to enlist.4 
4 In Israel there is no recognition of the right to conscientious objection for men, and an
incomplete recognition of the right for women. All Israeli citizens and permanent residents
aged 18 to 40 are liable to military service. Special rules apply to the exemption of Jewish
and Druze religious students and women. The Ministry of Defence does automatically 











   
    
        
  
      
    
        
      
     
        





     
Military service is the norm, but young Israelis still have to be sent their call-up papers
soon after their sixteenth birthday. Even though it goes without saying that young 
Israelis will do military service, the norm has to be cited in order for it to remain in 
force, and this opens up the possibility of refusal. In Bourdieu’s terms the agents’ 
habitus are harmonized, but until the process has been completed there remains a
margin of uncertainty as to the outcome (Bourdieu 1977, 9, Allen 1999, 72). It is within 
this context that from the age of 16, when they receive their call up papers, young 
Israelis make the public decision to refuse military service.
Aged 19, Hilel Garmi refused to enlist. His action took the form of willingly 
accepting that the consequence would be incarceration. This was not hidden resistance:
he had the option of approaching a military mental health officer with the intention of 
being declared medically unfit, but instead he chose to criticise and expose the system
(Hilel Garmi - I refuse 2018) . In his interview with Israel Social TV he describes how
the example of a Palestinian living in Gaza encouraged him to do politics differently.
Perhaps what triggered the idea that civil disobedience is the best thing to be done 
in this situation were the recent demonstrations on the Gaza border. During the 
demonstrations I read things written by Ahmed Abu Artema. He is considered the
initiator of the demonstrations. Although I did not agree with everything he wrote,
and his situation is, of course, not the same as mine, I was impressed to find people 
who try to deal with the situation between the Jordan river and the sea without
becoming violent. (Hilel Garmi - I refuse 2018)
Garmi not only put himself at risk of incarceration, he then shaped the meaning 
of his action by speaking out publicly, and in terms of numbers he linked his action to 
service. Palestinian Israelis may still volunteer to perform military service, but very few






     
  
    
 
  
   
 
      
  
        
      
      
 
 
        
         
        
the thousands of Palestinian demonstrators in the Gaza Strip. His admiration for the
action of someone he has never met, Ahmed Abu Artema, demonstrates his willingness
to recognise the ‘almost’ other.
Luhar Altman, aged 18, refused to enlist on the same day as Hilel Garmi. Her 
video testimony speaks of being born into ‘a reality not under our control’ and the need 
‘to act’ to make a better world (Luhar Altman - I refuse 2018) . Her refusal to enlist, 
was prompted by a period of study abroad with a Palestinian from Hebron. She explains
that she believes she has to make herself vulnerable (ie her action must take the form
that she willingly gives up her own physical security), if she is to have the possibility of 
talking to the other side ‘in a way that they will listen.’
When Mattan Helman refused to enlist in 2017 Israel Social TV made a video of 
the groups of people gathered outside the gates of the army base. A parent, whose only 
son was going to the army, was recorded shouting out. ‘He's cowardly, He's a shit. I'm a
single parent, I have a child who goes to the army. I'm left with nothing, Why should he
protect that garbage?' (For and Against Mattan Helman's Refusal 2017) She was
outraged that her son was going to risk his life to protect the young man who refused to 
do his military service. The reporter went on to ask the parent:
Can you have a conversation with these people?
No. Don’t you see that there is a split here? There's a divide.
And how do we reduce this divide?
I don't know. The government has to get involved. Something needs to be done.
The Israel Social TV reporter then asked Helman how he felt
How do these angry voices around make you feel?
I don't care about these voices. Let them say what they want. I go with my truth,
with my opinions, and I'm going to refuse.
18
  
   
 
   
  
 
   




    





   
 
 
    
   
  
The intersubjective violence of the exchange between the bystander and this refuser 
closes down the possibility of the oppositional views being structured into an inclusive
politics. It demonstrates the aspect of refusal as a form of negative power: a refusal of 
interaction and a refusal of power-with. Nonviolence demands that the actor is open to 
his or her opponent ‘in as much as we are all comrades’ (La Boétie 1975, 51). In this
case the bystander who loves and fears for her own son, and the refuser who by his
action has cut himself off from his peer group, have become antagonistic. 
Teenage refusers are under pressure to communicate with officials of the state, 
people at the gate of the army base, and also with family and friends. Some receive
support from family, others are ostracised. There may be one sibling who does military 
service and another who refuses within the same family: testimonies from Israel Social
TV for 2018 include a twin who refuses while her twin sister serves. Refusers voice the
hope that ‘it will not create insolvable conflicts’ within the family and they worry that
people will ‘look askance’ at their parents and siblings (Refusing for Peace 2018).
However, they also see that there are possibilities of family and friends holding fast
both to their political views and their feelings of kinship and friendship. This ‘both and’ 
quality is expressed with regard to family ‘My family mainly cares for me, meaning that
they do not support my decision, certainly not in the political sense, but mainly there is
a personal concern for me’ (Yahalom 09 February 2018). Similarly the refusers’ 
interviews reflect ties of friendship between people with a shared childhood ‘Yes, there
are people who have stopped talking to me and who have boycotted me since my 
refusal. But this is perhaps a test of friendship since I also have friends who enlisted and 
have stayed with me’ (Segal 2014). Segal’s words resonate with La Boétie’s
observation that friendship ‘flourishes not so much by kindnesses as by sincerity. What
makes one friend sure of another is the knowledge of his integrity’(1975, 77).
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Critical to the minority of teenagers who refuse military service are the support
organisations that they find beyond family and friends such as New Profile, Mesarvot, 
Yesh Gvul and Israel Social TV. The action of earlier refusers encourages new refusers
and is creative of more of the power that Arendt equates with nonviolence.
The practical action of these young people is not only a refusal of the coercive
violence that besieges and walls off the bodies of the Palestinians, but also of the
structural and cultural power relations of the second and third dimension which sustain 
the belief that personal security is dependent upon military preparedness and which 
constitute Jewish Israelis as occupiers and Palestinians as occupied. La Boétie
understood how this relationship is internalised saying ‘they will think they are obliged 
to suffer this evil, and will persuade themselves by example and imitation of others’ (La
Boétie 1975, 64-65). The refusers are exceptional in their insistence on thinking what
they are doing and avoiding ‘the complacent repetition of “truths”’ (Arendt 1958, 5).
My refusal actually made me understand that there is politics that goes beyond the 
politics of separation and loyalty to an oppressive regime in Israel. That there is
politics that says: if a government goes against our path, if a government goes
against a path of peace, equality, cooperation, we'll not willingly serve it.
(Yahalom 09 February 2018)
The form of this nonviolent action is willingness to accept incarceration; the meaning 
communicated is emancipatory of both Palestinians and Israelis; and because of this
inclusion of the other there is a possibility of increasing numbers.
Organised unarmed popular resistance
‘You sow your crops in order that he may ravage them.’ La Boétie berates the farmers
who live in a state of voluntary servitude and claims that a people enslaves itself by 
giving its consent to its misery, conniving with the thief who plunders its property, and 
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yielding their bodies for hard labour (1975, 46). He concedes that in the beginning of 
tyrannical rule men submit under constraint and by force, but goes on to say that a
subject people ‘fall into complete forgetfulness of its freedom’(1975, 55).
The Palestinians have their own word to describe the persistent, steadfast
awareness of, and everyday practice of freedom: şumūd.. My second example of 
practical action reflects on şumūd as practised by Palestinians living in the South 
Hebron Hills in Area C of the West Bank under Israeli military and civilian control.
This is an area I have been visiting since 1987 but the interviews quoted from here were 
gathered as part of an oral history research project supported by the Palestinian Popular 
Struggle Coordinating Committee and Coventry University in 2018. Here Palestinian 
agricultural land is at risk of confiscation for the building and expansion of illegal
Jewish only settlements, closure for military exercises by the Israeli occupation forces, 
or designation as nature or archaeological reserves (Gordon 2008). Palestinian villages
are also being severed from their agricultural land by the route of the Israeli built
Separation Wall (International Court of Justice 2004). The farmers who are made
landless under these circumstances have few options other than to seek employment in 
the illegal Jewish only settlements or risk crossing the Wall without permits to work in 
Israel.
‘In the past we were weaker, once we heard the shooting, we ran away.’5 This
farmer admits that, just as La Boétie described, Palestinians have been forced to
surrender their lands and their homes. Across the South Hebron Hills the population is




    
  














                  
                  
         
       
 
     
made up of Palestinians who have been physically displaced in 1948,6 endured 
Jordanian rule until 1967,7 have suffered ongoing displacement while living under 
Israeli occupation, and are neglected by the Palestinian Authority which since the Oslo 
Accords has surrendered military and civilian control of Area C to the Israeli
government, but they are not completely cowed. Occupation means not only losing land 
and homes, but also much self-confidence, self-reliance and self-respect. Keeping self-
respect alive is şumūd (Johansson and Vinthagen 2015, Darweish and Sellick 2017, 
Seidel 2017). To keep mutual self-respect alive is to be governed by the fourth 
dimension of power and practise disciplined nonviolence. 
Şumūd expands in numbers when someone shows willingness to put his own 
body in harm’s way rather than be subdued. A farmer described the physical violence
done to himself and his crops to force him off his land. ‘The settlers shot at me. I lost
my legs, they had to carry me on the back of a donkey which walked for 4kms.’ The
same farmer reported that ‘If I had not got injured and remained on my land, no one
would have known about it and the Israelis would have confiscated it.’ His physical
6 Interviewee in Al Twaneh, March 2018, ‘People from Abu Jendia family and Alhammedeh
family from Ar-ara in the Negev came to live with us.’
7 Interviewee in Al Twaneh, March 2019, aged 67 remembered Jordanian rule saying ‘What 
they did was worse than what Israel did. The Israeli army would not come and stay, they
would not feel safe. But the Jordanian army did not care, … you had to feed them, they
would not care. They would come to arrest someone and if the person they came for was not
here, they would stay for two or three days. They would order us to feed their horses, to give 
horses sugar to eat. They would stay until the person they came for returned. What the 
Jordanians did to us was not little. May God take our revenge from the Jordanians, the
Israelis, and the Palestinians. May God get rid of them all.’
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injury and stubborn lonely presence brought his struggle to the attention of other 
Palestinian farmers as well as the Israeli Human Rights Organisation B’Tselem. 
‘B’Tselem helped in this regard… the official at B’Tselem was smart and helped a lot.’ 
But not withstanding the increase in power-with of the individual farmer, who now had 
neighbours to work with him and the B’Tselem official as an advocate, the settlers also 
used physical violence against his crops. ‘We harvested our 25 dunam8 and we put the
wheat harvest in piles. We worked from morning till evening. In the early morning I 
learned that the settlers burned the harvest.’9 
The Israelis who live in the illegal settlements in the South Hebron Hills are a
daily physical threat to the farmers’ lives. ‘We feel so worried about our shepherds, we
feel worried about our children. When our children used to go to milk the sheep, people
wait for them to come back impatiently as they are worried they would be hurt by the
settlers.’10 Unarmed Italian volunteers from Operation Dove11 go on foot to provide a
protective presence and boost the confidence of the children (and their parents) to 
continue farming. The readiness of the Palestinian farmers to put their own bodies in the 
way of violence sends a message that their presence is protective not combative
(Wallace 2018). This has encouraged children, their parents, Israeli and international
human rights observers to participate with them in their struggle. 
The disciplined, public practice of şumūd is not to be taken for granted. Another 
third dimensional power holds sway over the youth in the South Hebron Hills. ‘There is
8 1 dunam is about 900 square metres
9 Interview, Qawawis, 2018
10 Interview, Al Twaneh, 2018












   
 
   
    
 
   
   
  
   
 
     
  
no connection between people now… the son leaves his parents and lives alone. They 
do not care for life as before. They are copying the life style of the Israelis. Their money 
is not blessed…’12 Some young people do not see it as the natural order of things that
they will preserve what was precious to their parents. As well as the pull of the third 
dimension there is also the possibility of second dimension structural domination within 
the organisation of popular resistance. The organisers in South Hebron Hills are aware
that the practice of nonviolent action can attract more people only if they are
relentlessly flexible (Soliman 2019). This may mean being prepared to make way for 
the younger generation. A student, aged 19, described how she felt ‘This is our culture
and it is our responsibility to save it.  I think it is the youth’s responsibility because we
have the energy, we are educated in universities –we can read, write and understand...’13 
Organised unarmed resistance becomes more popular and transforms power 
relations in its different dimensions as leaders demonstrate their willingness to put their 
own bodies in harm’s way, different groups of people with different capacities are
structured into the organised resistance, and a habitus is generated where energetic
practical action with others is the norm and violence is seen as inappropriate and 
ineffective. It is noticeable that this resistance is intimately entwined with the patterns
of domination: its leaders need to be seen to be suffering, if they are coopted, protected 
from physical harm, and seen to be living in comfort, they are rendered impotent. 
The Appeal for Boycott Divestment and Sanctions
‘It should not enter the mind of anyone that nature has placed some of us in slavery, 
12 Interviewee, Al Twaneh, March 2018










   
   
    
  
 
   
  
   
   
   
   
    
 
 
      
 
     
since she has actually created us all in one likeness.’ (La Boétie 1975, 51) My last
example deals with the relationship between people living in comfortable circumstances
and those who are suffering. On the first anniversary of the International Court of 
Justice’s 2004 ruling on the illegality of the Separation Wall (International Court of 
Justice 2004), 171 Palestinian civil society organisations issued an appeal over the
heads of states, to ‘people of conscience.’ ‘We appeal to you to pressure your respective
states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We invite conscientious
Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace’ (Boycott
Divestment and Sanctions Movement July 2005).
The Palestinian civil society organisations made their appeal from a position 
where the people they served were suffering from direct physical violence and 
restrictions on movement. Here are three examples of the companies that were targeted 
for profiting from the coercive control of Palestinian bodies. Until 2016 the British 
security company G4S provided security and control systems for prisons where
Palestinians were incarcerated. It has now been sold to the Israeli equity fund and has
become G4S Israel. Hewlett Packard technology was used to recognise the hands and 
faces of Palestinians at the biometric access controlled checkpoints in the West Bank 
and exits to and from the besieged Gaza Strip.14 Veolia Transportation operated buses
which transported Jewish Israelis only (discriminating against Palestinians). Veolia sold 
all of its holdings to Israeli investors in 2015.15 The response of these companies to the
BDS campaign suggests that the campaign contributed to the decision of these
14 https://whoprofits.org/company/hewlett-packard-enterprise-hpe/ Accessed 09 January 2019
15 https://whoprofits.org/updates/removing-veolia-environnement-transdev-and-caisse-des-








    
 
  
    
 
   
    
  





   
companies to withdraw from the Israeli market. But could the campaign be described as
nonviolent in its form, meaning and numbers?
In this relationship between the suffering and the comfortable, Palestinian 
advocates of boycott, divestment and sanctions have been ready to endure incarceration 
and restrictions on movement and have been unambiguous in their appeal for support. 
The form and meaning of their protest conform to my definition of nonviolence. My 
critical focus here is on whether the corresponding action from the ‘people of 
conscience’ who respond to the appeal has equal clarity. Michele Micheletti and Didem
Oral discuss ‘The Boycott Movement: The Case of Israel’ as an example of problematic
political consumerism, arguing that the overriding moral claim of the Palestinians
clashes with the overriding moral claim of victims of anti-Semitism leading to confused 
messaging on the part of BDS supporters (2018). Darweish and Rigby also assess that
the response to the Palestinian appeal has been muted in comparison to that of the
surrogate boycott of South Africa, which targeted companies operating in the apartheid 
state, because of competing moral claims (2015).
Inspired by my reading of La Boétie, I give a slightly different account of the
problematic ambiguity of the actions of those who respond positively to the Palestinian 
appeal for boycott, divestment and sanctions. La Boétie offers an insight that helps
situate the Palestinian civil society organisations’ interlocutors. In his description of the
dictator he describes the way in which the dictator is maintained by those who are
‘accomplices in his cruelties, companions in his pleasures, panders to his lusts, and 
sharers in his plunders’ (La Boétie 1975, 71). He counts those who profit under the
tyrant. ‘The consequence of all this is fatal indeed. And whoever is pleased to unwind 
the skein will observe that not the six thousand but a hundred thousand, and even 
millions, cling to the tyrant by this cord to which they are tied’ (La Boétie 1975, 71).
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Wherever they are situated people of conscience are inescapably complicit in the
complex system of global capitalism that sustains the inequalities between the
comfortable and the suffering. The hands of the comfortable are not clean. According to 
La Boétie, we are all implicated in the complex system that maintains oppression. 
Individual Israelis and their supporters argue that the implementation of boycott, 
divestment and sanctions against selected companies that profit from the occupation is
unjustifiable, on the grounds that supporters of boycott, divestment and sanctions
remain silent on these fourth dimensional ties that bind them to oppression in other 
contexts. In their counter-arguments, some campaigners have referenced changes which 
I situate in the second and third dimensions of power. For example, supporters of the
boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign have gone out of their way to insist that the
appeal for boycott, divestment and sanctions, is not a unilateral measure, but is a form
of rightful protest within the structures of international laws (Falk 2017, Micheletti and 
Oral 2018). Other supporters have made use of symbolic power by generating 
comparisons with the boycotts practised by the civil rights movement in the USA and 
the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa in order to shift the third dimension of 
power in which it is taken-for-granted that Palestinians’ movement should be controlled
and that young Israelis should be enlisted to wield that control (Sánchez and Sellick 
2017, 88). At the same time a fourth dimensional emancipatory power is emerging from
alliances between Palestinian campaigners and movements such as Black Lives Matter 
(Seidel, 2016) whose members accept that responding positively to the 2005 appeal
from Palestinian civil society is a necessary but insufficient part of a global unravelling 
of the knotted relationships which bind us all to La Boétie’s tyrant. 










   
    
    
  
   
   




   
    
 
    
  
     
 
  
So what did these three examples of practical action reveal about the possibility of 
stopping violence without the support of violence? They tell us about the importance of 
form and its relationship with embodiment; meaning and its relationship with 
intersubjectivity; and crucially numbers and their relationship with Arendt’s concept of 
power. ‘Indeed one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that
power always stands in need of numbers, whereas violence up to a point can manage
without them because it relies on implements’ (Arendt 1970, 42). The first two 
examples discussed do not yet have numbers. The Israeli refusers of military service
who take a public stand and risk imprisonment are an exceptional minority not a mass
movement. Palestinian campaigners and their Israeli and international allies who are
prepared to defend their land in Area C with their bodies have attracted solid support at 
the level of the small villages next to settlements and along the route of the Wall. 
However, they struggle to coordinate actions horizontally with other villages or to make
the vertical connections to the Palestinian national leadership (Soliman 2019). Not since
the first intifada 1987-93 has there been widespread and sustained participation in 
Palestinian campaigns of popular unarmed resistance, although the 2018 march in the
Gaza Strip demonstrates that when Palestinians resolve to do so the everyday hidden 
practice of şumūd can emerge with scale as organised public şumūd. The third case of 
the Appeal for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions struggles for numbers in the
occupied Palestinian territory where Palestinians have few economic options which are
independent of the Israeli economy, but has the potential to mobilise billions of people
externally to exercise consumer choice and to create transnational alliances.
All the examples show that nonviolence grows when it is not ring-fenced to a 
closed group. Arendt’s account of power-with, of solidarity that is not tied to identity 










   
  
 






example of the Palestinian leading the nonviolent march in Gaza to lift the siege. The
Palestinian farmer was able to stay on his land, partly thanks to the accompaniment of 
the Israeli working with B’Tselem. The Palestinians who made the appeal for boycott, 
divestment and sanctions used the information made public by the Israeli researchers
working with the organisation Who Profits. This inclusive nonviolence should not be
confused with dialogue, which often reinforces asymmetric power relations between 
participants (Thiessen and Darweish 2018). Instead this action is best described as
solidarity which allows movements to move beyond the oppositions and exclusions of 
identity politics (Allen, 2017, 2018, 87-118). 
Conclusion
I began by asking how effective nonviolence is in stopping violence by others. I 
have demonstrated that the answer is to be found in a typology of practice that
conceives of the self as willing to risk personal bodily harm, vigilant over 
meaning making, and acting freely in concert with others in the public realm. This
behaviour is founded in a phenomenological understanding of being-in-the-world 
combined with an attitude of epistemological humility. This means not only that
my view is incomplete and changeable, but that nothing is sacred and there are no 
ideal types. The power that emerges out of intersubjective encounters in which 
violence is marginalised is ‘risk taking’ because the participants willingly risk 
injury to, or incarceration of, their own bodies (not those of others) to do politics
differently. This power may be framed as a refusal, but it is never a closed-ness to 
the other, instead Zaru described it as ‘faithful’ (2008, 25). In extremis it is the
basis on which someone may freely choose to give up his or her own life rather 
















        
     
     
   
     
     
          
            
    
            
        
         
        
  
             
  
                 
 
person. Anything else and, as La Boétie explained, we acquiesce in our own 
subjection. La Boétie’s writing was speculative and he divorced his theory from
practice. By reading his essay in the context of practical action in Israel and the
occupied Palestinian territory I conclude that there is a possibility of doing 
politics differently and ruling ourselves without the support of violence.
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